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Abstract
In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowd-
sourcing markets such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTrk), ClickWorker (ClkWrkr), Crowd-
Flower (CrdFlwr). In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to ac-
complish some tasks. Each worker is assumed to give some utility to the requester on getting
hired. Moreover each worker has a minimum cost that he wants to get paid for getting hired.
This minimum cost is assumed to be private information of the workers. The question then is
- if the requester has a limited budget, how to design a direct revelation mechanism that picks
the right set of workers to hire in order to maximize the requester’s utility?
We note that although the previous work (Singer (2010); Chen et al. (2011)) has studied this
problem, a crucial difference in which we deviate from earlier work is the notion of large-scale
markets that we introduce in our model. The notion of a large-scale market that we consider is a
natural one which states that the (private) cost of each worker is small compared to the budget
of the requester. Without the large market assumption, it is known that no mechanism can
achieve a competitive ratio better than 0.414 and 0.5 for deterministic and randomized mecha-
nisms respectively (while the best known deterministic and randomized mechanisms achieve an
approximation ratio of 0.292 and 0.33 respectively). In this paper, we design a budget-feasible
mechanism for large markets that achieves a competitive ratio of 1−1/e ' 0.63. Our mechanism
can be seen as a generalization of an alternate way to look at the proportional share mechanism,
which is used in all the previous works so far on this problem. Interestingly, we can also show
that our mechanism is optimal by showing that no truthful mechanism can achieve a factor
better than 1− 1/e; thus, fully resolving this setting. Finally we consider the more general case
of submodular utility functions and give new and improved mechanisms for the case when the
market is large.
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1 Introduction
Crowdsourcing is a recent phenomenon that is used to describe the procurement of a large number
of workers to do certain tasks. These tasks can be of a variety of natures and - to give a few examples
- include image annotation, data labeling for machine learning systems, consumer surveys, rating
search engine results, spam detection, product reviews, etc. There are several platforms (such as
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTrk)) that facilitate and automate various steps involved in setting
up and executing crowdsourcing tasks.
A key challenge in these online labor markets is to be able to properly price the tasks. Since the
requester (the one who wants to procure workers) is usually budget constrained, pricing the tasks
too high can result in lower output for the requester. On the other hand, pricing the tasks too
low can disincentivize workers to work on the tasks. This makes pricing a non-trivial step for the
requester when setting up a crowdsourcing task. One idea - to make pricing more automated and
to prevent economic loss from poor pricing - is to design a direct revelation mechanism that solicits
bids from workers to report their cost of participation, and based on this decide which workers to
hire and how much to pay them.
A simple model that captures the above problem is as follows: There is a set S of workers.
Worker i has a private cost ci and provides utility ui to the requester on getting hired. We want
to design a truthful mechanism that decides which workers to recruit and how much to pay them.
The goal is to maximize the requester’s utility without violating her budget constraint.
For the above model, Singer (2010) gave an incentive-compatible mechanism that achieves an
approximation ratio of 1/6 compared to the offline optimum that knows the costs of the workers.
Later on Chen et al. (2011) improved the approximation ratio to 1
2+
√
(2)
' 0.292 (and to 1/3 for
randomized mechanisms). Chen et. al. also showed that no deterministic mechanism can achieve
an approximation ratio better than 1
1+
√
(2)
' 0.414, and no randomized mechanism can achieve an
approximation ratio better than 0.5.
Our work is motivated by the following observation: Most of the crowdsourcing tasks are large-
scale in nature in terms of the number of workers involved. On the other hand if one looks at the
impossibility result of Chen et al. (2011), they involve only a small number of workers (specifically,
only 3 workers). Thus, this leads to a natural open question - Do these lower bounds extend to
the case of large markets? or can one design better mechanisms for this important case of large
markets?
In this paper, we seek to understand the above question. We show that one can significantly
improve the approximation ratio for the case of large markets. We give a mechanism that achieves
an approximation ratio of 1−1/e ' 0.63 for large markets. In addition, we show that our mechanism
is the best possible mechanism by showing that no truthful budget-feasible mechanism can achieve a
factor better than 1−1/e. Finally, we look at the more general case of submodular utility functions.
1
1.1 The Model
We define the model abstractly: Consider a reverse auction scenario with one buyer and n sellers,
where the set of sellers is denoted by S. Each seller i ∈ S owns a single item (denoted by item i) and
has a private cost ci for it. The buyer derives a utility of ui from item i. The buyer has a limited
budget B, and its goal is to buy a subset of items that maximizes her utility without exceeding her
budget.
Note that if the sellers are not strategic and the costs are known to the buyer, then this is
the well-known knapsack optimization problem. However, the cost ci is assumed to be a private
information of seller i. Thus we are interested in designing direct-revelation mechanisms where the
buyer solicits bids from the sellers, and then computes which sellers to buy from and how much
to pay them. More formally, a mechanism M consists of two functions A : (R+)n → {0, 1}n and
P : (R+)n → (R+)n. The allocation function A(·) takes as input the costs of n sellers and reports
the set of winners. The payment function P (·) takes as input the costs of n sellers and reports how
much each seller should pay. Sometimes we will use functions Ai : (R+)n → {0, 1} (and similarly
Pi(·)) for each i ∈ S to refer to the restriction of functions A(·) and P (·) for seller i.
The mechanismM = (A,P ) should satisfy the following properties:
1. Budget Feasibility: The sum of the payments made to the sellers should not exceed B, i.e.,∑
i Pi(c) ≤ B for all c.
2. Individual rationality: A winner i ∈ S is paid at least ci.
3. Truthfulness/Incentive-Compatibility: Reporting the true cost should be a dominant strategy
of the sellers, i.e. for all non-truthful reports ci from seller i, it holds that
Pi(ci, c−i)− ci ·Ai(ci, c−i) ≤ Pi(ci, c−i)− ci ·Ai(ci, c−i)
Among all mechanisms that satisfy the above properties, we are interested in the ones that give
high utility to the buyer. Note that no mechanism can achieve utility larger than U∗(c,u), where
U∗(c,u) (or simply U∗ for brevity) is the utility of the knapsack optimization problem assuming
costs of the sellers are known to the buyer. We say a mechanism M is an α-approximation (for
α ≤ 1) if it gives utility at least α · U∗(c,u) for any c and u.
Indivisible vs Divisible Items. Note that the above description is given for indivisible items,
however, we can define the above problem for divisible items as well. For instance, if the item being
sold by a seller is his own time, then it can be modeled as a divisible item. For fraction x ≤ 1 of a
divisible item, the cost of seller i is x.ci and the utility obtained by the buyer is x.ui. The allocation
function for divisible items is defined as A : (R+)n → [0, 1]n.
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More general utility functions. An interesting generalization of the above model is when
the utility function over the set of items is a submodular function rather than additive functions.
We denote this function by U : 2S → R+ (for additive functions, U(T ) =
∑
i∈T ui, for ∀T ⊆ S).
We assume that the utility function is known to the buyer.
1.1.1 The Large Market Assumption
Crowd-sourcing systems are excellent examples of large markets. Informally speaking, a market
is said to be large if the number of participants are large enough that no single person can affect
the market outcome significantly. Our results take advantage of this nature of the crowdsourcing
markets to give better mechanisms.
We define the large market assumption as follows: We assume that in our model, the cost of
a single item is very small compared to the buyer’s budget B. More formally, let cmax = maxi∈S{ci}.
Then, the large market assumption is defined as below.
The Large Market Assumption: cmax  B.
In other words, we define the largeness ratio of the market to be θ = cmaxB and analyze our
mechanisms for θ → 0.
This assumption - also known as the small bid to budget ratio assumption - is used in other
large-market problems as well (for instance, see Mehta et al. (2007) for a similar definition with
application in online advertising). All the mechanisms that we present in the main body of the
paper (mechanisms for additive utility functions) will be analyzed under this assumption. The
mechanisms that we design for submodular utility functions work under a different large market
assumption which is explained below.
An Alternative Assumption We also suggest another definition for large markets, the discus-
sion of which will be deferred to the appendix. Our mechanisms for submodular utility functions
work under this assumption; moreover, we can slightly modify our mechanisms for additive utility
functions so that they work under this assumption as well, while preserving their approximation
ratio. We define this assumption below.
Let umax = maxi∈S ui and U∗ be the total utility of the optimum solution (i.e. the maximum
utility that the buyer can achieve when the costs are known to her). This large market assumption
states that:
The Alternative Large Market Assumption: umax  U∗.
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In other words, we define the largeness ratio of the market to be θ = maxi∈S uiU? and analyze
our mechanisms for when θ → 0.
We note that our impossibility result for additive utilities (Section 6) holds for either of the two
definitions.
1.2 Our Results
In this paper, we design optimal budget-feasible mechanisms for large markets. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first ones to study the case of large markets. We list our results below:
1. If the items are divisible, we design a deterministic mechanism which satisfies all the required
properties and has an approximation ratio of 1 − 1/e (Section 5). Note that previously, no
mechanism was known for the case of divisible items. In fact, one can show that no bounded
approximation ratio is possible for divisible items if the large market assumption is dismissed.
2. If the items are indivisible, we can modify our mechanism and give a randomized truthful
mechanism for this case which achieves an approximation ratio of 1− 1/e. (Section C)
3. In Section 6, we show that the above results are optimal by proving that no truthful (and
possibly) randomized mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e. Our
hardness result holds for both cases of divisible and indivisible items.
4. For the case of submodular utility functions, we design deterministic mechanisms that achieve
approximation ratios of 12 and
1
3 with exponential and polynomial running times respectively.
Note that we only consider the case of indivisible items for submodular utility functions.
(Section E)
As we saw in Section 1.1.1, one could define a notion of θ-large market, i.e. a market with
largeness ratio θ. To gain a better understating of the problem, we focus on large markets (i.e.
when θ → 0) and state our main theorems for this setting. However, our mechanisms do not need
“very large” markets to perform well; for instance, in the knapsack problem with additive utilities,
the approximation ratio 1 is (1 − 1/e) · (1 − 6θ/5) when all the items have equal utilities (Section
5.2). Thus, say for θ = 1/20 and θ = 1/40 (which are reasonable assumptions in many settings) we
get approximation factors 0.592 and 0.613 respectively.
Also we point out that the above results have applications beyond crowdsourcing - for instance,
see Singer (2011) for application in marketing over social networks, and Horel et al. (2013) for appli-
cation in experiment design. Singer (2011) provides a truthful mechanism with approximation ratio
≈ 0.032 and Horel et al. (2013) provides an approximately truthful mechanism with approximation
1we didn’t try to optimize the dependence on θ in our analysis as we focus on the main ideas for the sake of better
understanding.
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ratio ≈ 0.077. For both these settings, large market assumption is a very reasonable assumption
to make; thus, our results apply to these applications as well. In particular, our results give fully
truthful mechanisms for these applications with approximation ratios 12 ,
1
3 (for exponential and
polynomial running time respectively) in large markets.
1.3 Related Work
The most relevant related work is that of Singer (2010) and Chen et al. (2011). Singer (2010) first
introduced this model (without the large market assumption). For the case of additive utilities and
indivisible items, he gave a deterministic mechanism with an approximation ratio of 1/6. Chen
et al. (2011) later improved it to 1/(2 +
√
2), and also gave a randomized mechanism with an
approximation ratio of 1/3. They gave a lower bound of 1/(1 +
√
2) and 1/2 for deterministic and
randomized mechanisms respectively. For the case of submodular utilities, Singer (2010) gave a
randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of 1/112 which was improved to 1/7.91 by
Chen et al. (2011). Chen et al. (2011) also gave an exponential time deterministic mechanism for
submodular utility functions with an approximation ratio of 1/8.34.
Dobzinski et al. (2011) looked at the more general sub-additive utility functions and gave a
1/log2(n) and 1/log3(n) approximation ratio for randomized and deterministic mechanisms respec-
tively. Singla and Krause (2013a) design budget feasible mechanisms for adaptive submodular
functions with applications in community sensing.
In another work, Bei et al. (2012) study this problem in the bayesian setting. Singer (2011)
looks at the application of this model in marketing over social networks. Horel et al. (2013) study
the application of this model in experiment design.
Another related model that has been inspired from crowdsourcing applications is when the
workers arrive online. A sequence of papers model this as an online learning problem. See Singla
and Krause (2013b); Badanidiyuru et al. (2012); Singer and Mittal (2013) for more details.
Finally, we note that our assumption for large markets is similar to the assumption made in
other application areas; notably in the Adwords problem as studied by Mehta et al. (2007). See
Goel and Mehta (2008); Devanur and Hayes (2009); Feldman et al. (2010, 2009) for other models
motivated by online advertising where they make similar assumptions.
1.4 Roadmap
The readers are encouraged to read this section before proceeding further. We begin by developing
some intuition in Section 3. In Section 2, a simple proportional share mechanism which forms the
basis for Singer (2010); Chen et al. (2011) is introduced. The mechanism picks a single cutoff for the
utility to cost ratio in such a way that the whole budget is consumed. In Section ??, we generalize
the simple proportional share mechanism to a class of mechanisms parameterized by a single-variable
allocation function. In later sections, we show that this generalization improves the approximation
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ratio 2. We develop some intuition by considering a simple instance of our generalized mechanisms:
instead of a hard cutoff that is used in the proportional share mechanism, i.e. a two-level allocation
rule, we consider a special class of three-level allocation rules and show that they can improve the
approximation ratio.
The generalized mechanisms introduced are not in general truthful. In Section ??, we introduce
a simple method to make them truthful, while maintaining their individually rational and budget-
feasibility. Later when we introduce the optimal mechanism, we show that its approximation ratio
does not get compromised by utilizing this method in large markets.
In Section 5, we find one of the generalized mechanisms which provides an approximation ratio
of 1 − 1/e in large markets. In Section 6, we complement this result by showing that no truthful
mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than 1 − 1/e. In Section C, we adapt our
mechanism to the case of indivisible items.
In Section E, we present two mechanisms for submodular utility functions which have exponential
and polynomial running times and approximation ratios 12 and
1
3 , respectively.
2 A Simple 1
2
-Approximate Truthful Mechanism
In this section, we briefly explain the previous mechanism designed for this problem for the additive
utility functions that gives an approximation factor of 12 in large markets.
Definition 1 Cost-per-utility rate of a seller i is equal to ci/ui.
A natural approach to this problem tries to find a single payment-per-utility rate (denoted by
rate r) at which all the winning sellers get paid. In other words, this approach picks a single number
r and makes a payment of r.ui to seller i if she wins and pays her 0 otherwise. For brevity, we
sometimes call the payment-per-utility rate r simply the rate r when there is no risk of confusion.
Individual rationality implies that a seller i is willing to sell her item at rate r iff r ≥ ci/ui.
Initially the buyer declares a very large rate r, and then sees which sellers are willing to sell at
this rate. If the total cost to buy from all these sellers at rate r is higher than the budget B, then
the buyer decreases the rate r. More formally, a natural descending price auction for this problem
works as follows:
1. Let A denote the set of active sellers, and initially set A = S.
2. Start with a very high rate r.
3. Verify if all the active sellers can be paid with rate r, i.e. whether
∑
i∈A r.ui ≤ B or not.
4. If the payment is feasible, then allocate the subset A, make the payment and stop.
2Although the truthfulness is sacrificed, later we augment the mechanism so that it becomes truthful without
compromising the approximation ratio in large market.
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5. If the payment is not feasible then decrease r slightly; update A accordingly by removing the
sellers i for whom ci/ui > r; go to Step 3.
The above auction captures the main idea behind the proportional share mechanisms designed
in Singer (2010); Chen et al. (2011)3, although they describe it in a forward auction format. It is
not hard to see that the above mechanism is truthful, budget-feasible, and in large markets achieves
an approximation ratio of 12 (with small modifications, this can be converted to a randomized
1
2 -approximation for arbitrary markets as well Chen et al. (2011)).
3 Our Approach
In this section, we give a high level overview of our approach. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are preliminary
sections and must be read before proceeding further. The notions defined in these sections are
explained more intuitively using an example in Section 3.3. Also for rest of the paper we will
assume that the sellers’ items are divisible, unless we explicitly talk about indivisible items.
3.1 A Notion of An Allocation Rule
To build our new ideas, we first introduce and formalize the notion of an allocation rule.
An allocation rule f : R+ → [0, 1] is a function which determines how much to buy from a given
seller. The domain of allocation rules is the cost per utility rate; meaning, given a (ui, ci) pair of
seller i, the allocation rule f says that we should buy f( ciui ) fraction of seller i’s item. We do not
enforce using the same allocation rule for all sellers.
We say an allocation rule f : R+ → [0, 1] is a Standard Allocation Rule if f is a decreasing
function such that f(0) = 1 and f(e− 1) = 0.4
For any standard allocation rule f : R+ → [0, 1], we can define an associated family of allocation
rules
F(f) = {fr : R+ → [0, 1]}r>0
where fr denotes an allocation rule which is same as f except that it is stretched along the horizontal
axis with ratio r, i.e. fr(x) = f(x/r) for all x ≥ 0.
As we will see later, any single standard allocation rule f and its corresponding family of
allocation rules F(f) will uniquely specify our mechanism. At a high level, our mechanism will
work as follows: we will pick the largest positive r such that fr ∈ F(f) is budget-feasible; meaning
the sum of the payments with allocation rule fr does not exceed B. However, note that we have
not yet defined a payment rule given an allocation rule fr - we define it next.
3 It is worth pointing out that for submodular utilities, they need to use an additional trick: constructing a (sorted)
list of sellers in a greedy manner before running the auction.
4The choice of e− 1 is just for simplifying the future calculations; it can be replaced with any other constant.
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fr
1
ci/ui
Figure 1: With allocation rule fr, the payment to seller i is defined to be ui times the shaded area under
the curve.
3.2 Payment Rule
Recall that given a function fr ∈ F(f) and (ui, ci) pair for a seller i, the value of fr( ciui ) only tells
us what fraction of seller i’s item to buy. But how much should we pay seller i in order to give
incentives to seller i to report its cost truthfully to the mechanism? We compute these payments
based on the well known Myerson’s characterization of the truthful mechanisms Myerson (1981).
Let the payment rule for seller i is denoted by Pi,r : R+ → R+ for an allocation rule fr. Here
Pi,r maps the reported cost of seller i into its payment.
To define Pi,r, we do the following thought process: Let’s divide seller i’s item into ui different
pieces. Note that now the seller’s cost for each piece is ciui . Thus function fr can now be seen as
mapping the cost of a single piece into the fraction of that piece that we will buy. Let Qr(x) :
R+ → R+ denote the function that maps the cost for a single piece into a payment for that piece.
Now, Myerson’s characterization Myerson (1981) says that the payment for each piece is given by
the following formula:
Qr(x) = x · fr(x) +
∫ ∞
x
fr(y) d y.
Intuitively, Qr(x) represents the area under the curve as seen in Figure 1. Going forward, we
will call the function Qr a unit-payment rule. Note that Pi,r(x) and Qr are related by the following
formula:
Pi,r(x) = ui ·Qr(x/ui),
Thus, to summarize, for an allocation rule fr, we buy fr(ci/ui) units of her item, and pay her
Pi,r(ci) amount of money.
Remark: We make a remark that the above payment rule is truthful only if the allocation rule fr
that is offered to seller i doesn’t depend on the private information (cost ci in this case) of the seller
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i. If the allocation rule fr does depend on the private information of the seller, then the mechanism
may or may not be truthful. In the next section we give a mechanism in which the allocation rule
fr for a seller i depends on its reported costs. Later in section 4, we give a mechanism where the
allocation rule fr for a seller i doesn’t depend on its reported cost, thus our payment rule will ensure
that the resulting mechanism is truthful.
3.3 Example
Suppose the buyer has budget B = 13/3, S = {s1, s2} and sellers s1, s2 each own an item with cost
2 and 4, respectively. Also, suppose both of the items have utility 1.
Let the mechanism use the family of curves F(f) for f(x) = 1 − x where the domain of f is
[0, 1]. The mechanism should find the largest r for which fr is budget feasible. To this end, we set
r to be a very large number and decrease r until fr is budget feasible. For instance, suppose we
start from r = 10 (see Figure 2). Observe that the payment of the mechanism in this case would be
4.8 and 4.2 to s1 and s2, respectively. Since the sum of payments exceed 13/3, then r = 10 is not
budget feasible. Consequently, we reduce r further until the mechanism becomes budget feasible at
r = 4: At this point, the payment of the mechanism to s1 and s2 would respectively be 8/3 and
5/3, which sum up to be exactly B. (see Figure 3)
Figure 2: The mechanism is not budget feasible at r = 10.
Figure 3: The mechanism is budget feasible at r = 6.
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3.4 First Attempt: A Parameterized Class of Envy-Free Mechanisms
In this section we describe a mechanism (denoted by Mechanism Envy-Free(f)) that is not always
truthful, but it will form the basis of our truthful mechanism. Moreover, some structural results
about this mechanism will be useful while analyzing our truthful mecahanism, thus we will be talking
about this mechanism throughout the paper. This mechanism is parameterized by the choice of a
standard allocation rule f . The mechanism described in this section offers a single allocation rule
fr ∈ F(f) to all the sellers, thus it is envy-free (although it may not be truthful).
Definition 2 We say that an allocation rule fr is a budget-feasible allocation rule if
∑
i∈S Pi,r(ci) =
B, i.e. the payments defined with respect to fr sum up to B.
Now given any standard allocation rule f , the mechanism starts with a very large scaling ratio
r =∞ so that we are guaranteed to have ∑i∈S Pi,r(ci) > B.
Then, the mechanism decreases r until the rule fr becomes a budget-feasible rule (say at r = r?).
The mechanism stops at this point and uses fr? and {Pi,r?}i∈S to determine the allocations and
payments. The ratio r? is also called the stopping rate of the mechanism. We define this process
formally in Mechanism Envy-Free(f).
Mechanism Envy-Free: Parameterized by a standard allocation rule f
input : Budget B, (ui, ci) pair for each seller i
output: A scaling ratio r?
r ←∞;
while fr is not a budget-feasible rule do
Decrease r slightly;
end
r? ← r;
Output the scaling ratio r?;
One can easily see that the above mechanism is budget-feasible, individually rational, and envy-
free; however, it may not be truthful. Also, the efficiency of the above mechanism depends on the
choice of function f . Thus, an important question is: What is the optimal choice of function f?
Let’s first understand the performance of the above mechanism for a simple choice of function f .
Definition 3 A standard allocation rule f : R+ → [0, 1] is called a uniform standard allocation rule
if f(x) = 1 for x < e− 1, and f(x) = 0 otherwise. Figure 4 depicts this curve.
One can show that the above envy-free mechanism when run using a uniform standard allocation
rule, mimics the simple factor 12 mechanism presented earlier. Thus, it turns out to be truthful as
well for this choice of standard allocation rule. However for more general allocation rules, the above
envy-free mechanism might not be truthful. Thus before we answer the harder question about the
optimal choice of function f , we next describe the truthful version of the above envy-free mechanism.
10
Allocation
cost per utility rate
1
e− 1
Figure 4: The Uniform Standard Allocation Rule
4 A Parameterized Class of Truthful Mechanisms
We use a simple trick to convert Mechanism Envy-Free(f) to a truthful mechanism. The idea is to
define, for each seller i, an allocation rule which does not depend on ci. In particular, we define the
allocation rule for seller i to be fri , where ri will be chosen independently of ci. For finding ri, we
run Mechanism Envy-Free(f) on the instance which is obtained by setting ci to be 0 while keeping
cost of the other sellers intact; ri would be the stopping rate of the mechanism Envy-Free(f). The
formal definition of the truthful mechanism appears in Mechanism Truthful(f).
Mechanism Truthful(f): Parameterized by a standard allocation rule f
input : Budget B, (ui, ci) pair for each seller i
foreach i ∈ S do
temp← ci;
ci ← 0;
ri ← Mechanism Envy-Free(f);
ci ← temp;
end
foreach i ∈ S do
Allocate fri(ci) from seller i;
Pay Pi,ri(ci) to seller i;
end
In Lemma 2, we prove that Mechanism Truthful(f) is individually rational, truthful, and budget-
feasible for any given standard allocation rule f . First, we state the following useful lemma.
Lemma 1 For any seller i ∈ S we have r? ≥ ri.
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that Pi,r(x) is an increasing function of r (for a fixed x) and
is a decreasing function of x (for a fixed r). The proof is by contradiction, suppose r? < ri. Let
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c′j = cj for all j ∈ S\{i} and let c′i = 0. Observe that
B =
∑
j∈S
Pj,r?(cj) ≤
∑
j∈S
Pj,r?(c
′
j)
<
∑
j∈S
Pj,ri(c
′
j)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that Pj,r?(x) is a decreasing function of x and the second
inequality is due to the fact that r? < ri. However, note that the above inequalities imply that
B <
∑
j∈S Pj,ri(c
′
j), which contradicts with the budget feasibility of Mechanism Envy-Free(f): see
that
∑
j∈S Pj,ri(c
′
j) represents the payment of Envy-Free(f) when the costs are c
′
1, . . . , c
′
n, and so it
can not be larger than B. 2
Lemma 2 Mechanism Truthful(f) is individually rational, truthful, and budget-feasible.
Proof. Note that the allocation and payment rules for seller i, i.e. fri , Pi,ri , do not depend on
the cost reported by her. This fact, along with the fact that fri is a monotone rule (decreasing
function) implies individual rationality and truthfulness. The proof is almost identical to the proof
of Myerson’s Lemma and we do not repeat it here.
The proof for budget feasibility needs a bit more work. Let pi, p′i denote the payments to
seller i respectively in Mechanism Truthful(f) and Mechanism Envy-Free(f), i.e. pi = Pi,ri(ci) and
p′i = Pi,r?(ci). The lemma is proved if we show that pi ≤ p′i, since we have
∑
i∈S p
′
i = B.
To see pi ≤ p′i, note that Pi,r(x) is an increasing function of r (for a fixed x). So, since we have
r? ≥ ri due to Lemma 1, it must be the case that Pi,ri(ci) ≤ Pi,r?(ci). 2
5 A (1− 1/e)-Approximate Optimal Truthful Mechanism
So far, we have introduced a parameterized class of individually rational, truthful, and budget-
feasible mechanisms for the problem: Passing any standard allocation rule f to Mechanism Truthful(f)
fixes the mechanism which we denote byMf . Our goal in this section is to find the most efficient
mechanism in this class. Formally, given a standard allocation rule f , we denote the approximation
ratio ofMf by Rf and define it as:
Rf = inf
I
Uf (I)
U?(I) ,
where the infimum is taken over all instances I of the problem 5 . Here Uf (I) denotes the utility
obtained byMf in instance I, and U?(I) denotes the optimum utility in instance I.
5If we are focused on large markets, we take only instances I for which the largeness ratio is smaller than some
threshold, and take the limiting approximation factor as the threshold goes to 0.
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The most efficient allocation rule f , is the one which maximizes Rf . Our goal, in this section
and Section 6, is to find the most efficient allocation rule and its corresponding approximation ratio.
Formally, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The most efficient standard allocation rule for Mechanism Truthful(f) is f(x) = ln(e−
x), for which we get Rf = 1− 1/e, i.e. it has an approximation ratio 1− 1/e.
We prove this theorem in two parts: In the first part we show that Rf ≥ 1 − 1/e for f(x) =
ln(e − x); this is proved in the current section. In the second part, we show that Rg ≤ 1 − 1/e
for any standard allocation rule g. This fact can be seen as a consequence of our hardness result
in Section 6, which states that no truthful mechanism can achieve approximation ratio better than
1 − 1/e. We also provide a more direct (alternative) proof in Section D that shows our choice of
f(x) = ln(e− x) is optimal among all possible choices of the standard allocation rules.
5.1 Finding an optimal f for the (non-truthful) Mechanism Envy-Free(f)
In this section, we prove that Mechanism Envy-Free(f) has approximation ratio 1− 1/e for f(x) =
ln(e − x). Note that the Mechanism Envy-Free(f) is not truthful, however its analysis will be
helpful when analyzing our truthful mechanism in Section 5.2 and in Section A. Here, we analyze
Mechanism Envy-Free(f) assuming that the true costs are known; later, in Section 5.2, we use this
result to prove that Mechanism Truthful(f) has approximation ratio 1− 1/e for the same choice of
f .
5.1.1 Preliminaries
We use gr to denote the inverse of an allocation rule fr, i.e. gr(x) = f−1r (x). Given an allocation
rule fr, we also write an alternative definition of its corresponding unit-payment rule Qr. This
definition, rather than being in terms of ciui , would be in terms of fr(
ci
ui
). This alternative definition
is denoted by Gr, and is defined such that Qr( ciui ) = Gr(f(
ci
ui
)). For instance, if a seller owns an
item with utility 1, then we pay her Gr(x) when a fraction x of her item is allocated. To be more
precise, for y = fr( ciui ) we define
Gr(y) =
∫ y
0
gr(x) dx = Qr(
ci
ui
).
We also denote g1 and G1 respectively by g and G.
Proposition 1 Given the standard allocation rule f(x) = ln(e− x), it is straight-forward to verify
that g(x) = e− ex and G(x) = ex− ex + 1. Also, fr(x) = ln
(
er−x
r
)
.
From now on in this section, we assume that f(x) = ln(e − x). Next, we prove a useful inequality
in the following lemma which will be used in the analysis of Envy-Free(f).
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Lemma 3 For any x, α such that 0 ≤ x, α ≤ 1 we have
G(x)− α · g(x) ≤ e · (x− α · (1− 1/e)).
Proof.
α(ex − 1) ≤ ex − 1
⇒ αex − ex + 1 ≤ α
⇒ αex − ex + 1 + e(x− α) ≤ α+ e(x− α)
(by the definition of g,G) ⇒ G(x)− α · g(x) ≤ e · (x− α · (1− 1/e)).
2
5.1.2 Approximation Ratio of Mechanism Envy-Free(f)
In the following lemma, we prove the efficiency of Mechanism Envy-Free(f) when all sellers report
true costs.
Lemma 4 If sellers report true costs, then Mechanism Envy-Free(f) has approximation ratio 1 −
1/e.
Proof. Observe that w.l.o.g. we can assume r? = 1: If r? 6= 1, then we can construct a new
instance which is similar to the original instance and has stopping rate 1. More precisely, there
exists some β > 0 such that if we multiply the budget and the reported costs by β, the stopping rate
becomes equal to 1. Note that this operation will not change the optimal solution or the solution
of Envy-Free(f) and can be performed w.l.o.g.
Now, suppose that a fraction xi of item i is allocated by Envy-Free(f). Since r? = 1, we can
use Lemma 3 to write the following set of inequalities:
G(xi)− αi · g(xi) ≤ e · (xi − αi · (1− 1/e)) ∀i ∈ S,
where αi is the fraction that is allocated from seller i in the optimal solution (recall that we are
are comparing Envy-Free(f) with the optimum fractional solution). The above inequalities can be
multiplied by ui on both side and be written as:
ui · (G(xi)− αi · g(xi)) ≤ ui · e · (xi − αi · (1− 1/e)) ∀i ∈ S.
By adding up these inequalities, we get:∑
i∈S
ui · (G(xi)− αi · g(xi)) ≤ e ·
∑
i∈S
ui · (xi − αi · (1− 1/e)) . (1)
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Now, we show that if
0 ≤
∑
i∈S
ui · (G(xi)− αi · g(xi)) , (2)
then the lemma is proved using (1) and (2). First we show why (1) and (2) prove the lemma, and
then in the end, we prove (2) itself.
Observe that (1) and (2) imply that
0 ≤
∑
i∈S
ui · (xi − αi · (1− 1/e)) . (3)
Now, let U denote the utility gained by Envy-Free(f) and U? =
∑
i∈S uiαi denote the utility of the
optimum (fractional) solution; see that (3) implies
(1− 1/e) · U? =
∑
i∈S
αiui · (1− 1/e) ≤
∑
i∈S
xiui = U,
This would prove the lemma.
So, it only remains to show that (2) holds: First observe that
∑
i∈S ui · G(xi) = B, since the
sum represents the payment of Envy-Free(f). Also, see that
∑
i∈S αiui · g(xi) ≤ B, since this sum
is a lower bound on the cost of the optimal solution, which is at most B. 2
5.2 Special case: Analyzing our truthful mechanism for unit utilities
In this section, we prove that Mechanism Truthful(f) has approximation ratio 1 − 1/e in large
markets when it uses the standard allocation rule f(x) = ln(e− x) for the special case when all the
utilities are equal to 1. In other words, we will show that approximation ratio approaches 1 − 1/e
as θ, the market’s largeness ratio, approaches 0 for the case of unit utilities. The proof for the case
of general utilities is intricate and appears in Section A.
Note that the assumption of unit utilities imply ci/ui = ci for any seller i. Next, we state two
lemmas before proving the approximation ratio. For simplicity in the analysis, w.l.o.g., assume that
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cn.
Lemma 5 r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . ≥ rn.
Lemma 6 Let u?(b) : R+ → R+ denote the maximum utility that the buyer can achieve with budget
b (when the items are divisible). Then, u?(b) is a concave function.
Proofs for both of these lemmas are straight-forward and are deferred to the appendix, Section
B.
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Lemma 7 Mechanism Truthful(f) has approximation ratio 1− 1/e when all the items have utility
equal to 1.
Proof. Recall that U? = u?(B) and let U denote the utility achieved by Mechanism Truthful(f).
We need to show that (1− 1/e) ·U? ≤ U . Instead of showing that U =∑i∈S fri(ci) is large enough
compared to U?, we show that
∑
i∈S frn(ci) is large enough compared to U
?; the lemma then would
be proved since we have frn(ci) ≤ fri(ci) for all i ∈ S. To see why frn(ci) ≤ fri(ci), it is enough to
note that rn ≤ ri due to Lemma 5 which implies frn(ci) ≤ fri(ci).
We consider two cases for the proof: In Case 1 we assume cmax ≤ c, and in Case 2 we assume
otherwise, where the number c is the cost at which frn(c) = 1 − 1/e, more precisely, this happens
at c = rn(e− e1−1/e).
Case 1 In this case, observe that we have frn(ci) ≥ 1− 1/e for all i ∈ S, which implies fri(ci) ≥
1− 1/e. This just means U ≥ (1− 1/e)n ≥ (1− 1/e)U?.
Case 2 Let Un =
∑
i∈S frn(ci), we will show that
Un ≥ (1− 1/e) · (1− o(1)) · U?. (4)
To prove this, consider an auxiliary instance in which, instead of budget B, we have a reduced
budget B′ =
∑
i∈S Qrn(ci). Note that if we run Mechanism Envy-Free(f) on the auxiliary instance,
then its stopping rate is rn, and so, the utility gained by the mechanism is exactly Un. Let U?aux
denote the optimal utility in the auxiliary instance. Then, by applying Lemma 4 on the auxiliary
instance, we have Un ≥ (1− 1/e) · U?aux. So, if we show that
U?aux ≥ (1− o(1)) · U? (5)
then (4) holds and the proof is complete.
We use Lemma 6 to prove (5): First, we show that B′ ≥ (1− o(1)) ·B; then, applying Lemma 6
would imply that u?(B′) ≥ (1− o(1)) · u?(B), which is identical to (5) by definition. So all we need
to complete the proof is showing that B′ ≥ (1− o(1)) ·B.
To this end, we prove that B′ ≥ (1−α· cmaxB )·B, where α is a constant with value (e−e1−1/e)−1 ≈
6/5. This would prove the Lemma due to the large market assumption. First, observe that
B = Qrn(0) +
∑
i∈S\{n}
Qrn(ci) ≤ Qrn(0) +B′
⇒ B′ ≥ B −Qrn(0) ≥ B − rn. (6)
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Now, recall that in Case 2, we have cmax ≥ c, which implies
B ≥ c · B
cmax
= rn(e− e1−1/e) · B
cmax
⇒ cmax · (e− e1−1/e)−1 ≥ rn. (7)
Combining (6) and (7) implies B′ ≥ (1− α · cmaxB ) ·B with the promised value for α. 2
6 Impossibility Result: On why 1− 1/e is the best approximation
possible
In this section we show that no truthful (and possibly) randomized mechanism achieves approxima-
tion ratio better than 1 − 1/e. We prove a stronger claim by allowing satisfying budget feasibility
in expectation, i.e. we prove that no truthful mechanism that is budget feasible in expectation can
achieve ratio better than 1− 1/e. From now on in this section, we assume that all the mechanisms
that we refer to are truthful, and are also budget feasible in expectation. First, we prove the claim
assuming that the items are indivisible, then we will see that the same proof easily extends to
divisible items as well.
Proof Outline. We construct a bayesian instance of the problem and prove that no budget fea-
sible truthful mechanism for this instance can achieve approximation ratio better than 1− 1/e; this
also implies that no mechanism for the prior-free setting can achieve ratio better than 1 − 1/e 6.
The proof is done in two steps. First, we show that for any truthful mechanism for this instance,
there exist a simple posted price mechanism that achieves at least the same revenue. The posted
price mechanism simply offers the same price p to every seller and pays p to any seller who accepts
the offer and 0 to others. In the second step of the proof, we show that for any choice of p, such
mechanisms can not achieve a ratio better than 1 − 1/e. The proof that we present w.l.o.g. ana-
lyzes the market in expectation: budget feasibility is satisfied in expectation; also, the utility of the
mechanisms are computed in expectation.
We now give the full proof by first giving our hardness instance.
6This is so because an α-approximate mechanism in the prior-free setting is also α-approximate in the bayesian
setting
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The Hardness Instance. We construct a bayesian instance of the problem in which all the sellers
have unit utility and their costs are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution with CDF F , defined as follows:
F (x) =
1/e if x = 0,1
e(1−x) if 0 < x <= 1− 1/e.
In other words, F (x) denotes the probability that the cost of a seller is at most x. Let D be
the distribution defined by F and let c denote the expected cost of a seller sampled from D, i.e.
c = Ex∼D[x]. We define the budget to be B = c ·N where N ≥ 1 is an arbitrary integer denoting
the number of sellers.
Definition 4 A posted price mechanism is a mechanism that offers a price pi to any seller i ∈ S,
and pays her pi if she accepts the offer and pays her 0 otherwise.
Definition 5 A uniform posted price mechanism is a posted price mechanism that offers the same
price to all sellers.
Definition 6 A cut-off allocation rule is an allocation rule which allocates the whole unit of an
item if its cost is less than a certain cut-off and allocate 0 units otherwise. Let cutoff(p) denote a
cut-off allocation rule with the cut-off price p.
It is clear that posted price mechanisms use cut-off allocation rules to allocate items from sellers.
Lemma 8 If the sellers costs are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution D, then for any mechanism in
this bayesian setting there exists a posted price mechanism with the same approximation ratio.
Proof. Due to Myerson’s Lemma (see footnote ??), any truthful mechanism in the bayesian
setting can be seen as a set of allocation and payment rules corresponding to each seller, where the
allocation rule is a decreasing function (of the cost) and the payment rule is defined with respect
to the allocation rule as we saw in Figure 1. Given such an allocation rule for an arbitrary seller
i ∈ S, namely Ai, one can think of a simpler way to implement Ai (in expectation) by finding a
distribution pii over cut-off allocation rules.
More precisely, we find the distribution pii with PDF fi such that the distribution pii over all cut-
off allocation rules, which assigns probability density fi(x) to the cut-off allocation rule cutoff(x),
implements the allocation rule Ai in expectation. We prove the existence of pii in the following
claim.
Claim 1 Define the distribution pii by its CDF Fi(·) such that Fi(x) = 1−Ai(x) for any cost x ≥ 0.
Then pii would implement Ai in expectation.
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Proof. All we need to show that a seller with price x would be allocated with probability Ai(x)
in pii. To see this, note that the probability that the seller is allocated is exactly equal to the
probability of observing a cut-off price at least x when a cut-off price is sampled from pii. This
probability is equal to 1− (1−Ai(x)) by the definition of pii; this proves the claim. 2
Now, we claim that the cut-off allocation rule with the cut-off price
pi = F
−1
(∫ ∞
0
fi(p) · F (p)dp
)
(8)
achieves the same utility and spends the same budget (in expectation) as the allocation rule Ai
paired with its corresponding Myerson payment rule.
Claim 2 For any seller i ∈ S, cutoff(pi) achieves the same utility and spends the same budget (in
expectation) as the allocation rule Ai paired with its corresponding Myerson payment rule.
Proof. The main idea of the proof is that the set of points P = {(F (x), xF (x)) : 0 ≤ x < 1} forms
a straight line in the two-dimensional plane; See Figure 5 for a proof by picture. Note that F (x)
Figure 5: This parametric plot is representing the set of points P for x = 0 to x = 1. The horizontal and
vertical axis respectively represent F (x) and xF (x)
denotes the expected allocation when a price x is offered to a seller and xF (x) is the corresponding
expected payment.
Now, see that the expected utility achieved by the allocation rule Ai is
∫∞
0 fi(p)F (p)dp, which
is exactly equal to the expected utility achieved by cutoff(p) due to (8). To prove the claim, it
remains to verify that the Myerson payment rules corresponding to cutoff(pi) and Ai spend the
same budget (in expectation). To this end, just observe that P is a straight line; consequently, since
the allocation rules Ai, cutoff(pi) allocate equal units of items (in expectation), then they also spend
the same amount of the budget (in expectation). 2
19
Due to Claim 2, the posted price mechanism that offers price pi to seller i is budget feasible
(in expectation) and also achieves an expected utility equal to the utility of the originally given
mechanism. This proves the claim. 2
Lemma 9 If the sellers costs are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution D, then for any (budget feasible)
posted price mechanism there exists a (budget feasible) uniform posted price mechanism with the same
approximation ratio.
Proof. Suppose that {pi}i∈S denotes the offered prices in a posted price mechanism and let
p = F−1
(
1
|S| ·
∑
i∈S
F (pi)
)
.
First, observe that the uniform posted price mechanism with price p achieves a utility equal to
the utility of the original posted price mechanism; this can be verified simply due to linearity of
expectation. It remains to verify that the uniform posted price mechanism is budget feasible. To
this end, just observe that the set of points P (depicted in Figure 5) is a straight line; consequently,
since the posted price mechanism and the uniform posted price mechanism allocate equal units of
items (in expectation), then they also spend the same amount of the budget (in expectation). 2
Theorem 2 For the case of indivisible items, no truthful budget feasible mechanism can achieve
approximation ratio better than 1− 1/e.
Proof. We use Lemma 9 and show that no uniform posted price mechanism can achieve ratio
better than 1− 1/e. Equivalently, we show that the uniform posted price mechanism which spends
all the budget in expectation has approximation ratio no better than 1− 1/e.
To define the uniform posted price mechanism that spends all the budget in expectation, we
need to find p∗ such that p∗F (p∗) · N = B. Given the definitions of F (·) and B, we can solve
this equation to get p∗ = e−2e−1 . Now, we are ready to compute the approximation ratio. First,
note that the (expected) utility of the uniform posted price mechanism is N · F (p∗). If we had∑
i∈S ci ≤ B, then we had U∗ = N (the optimum solution could buy all items), and so we could
write the approximation ratio as
N · F (p∗)
N
= F (p∗) = 1− 1/e,
which would prove the claim. However, although E
[∑
i∈S ci
]
= B, the sum is not always bounded
by B, which means U∗ = N does not always hold. We find a way to fix this issue using Hoeffding
bounds (see Section F to see formal statements of Hoeffding bounds). We show that although∑
i∈S ci is not always bounded by B, it is concentrated around its mean, B, with high probability.
We will see that this is enough to prove the theorem.
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As a consequence of Hoeffding bounds (stated in Section F), for any  > 0 we have:
Pr
[∑
i∈S
ci ≥ (1 + ) ·B
]
≤ e−|S| (9)
Recall that we defined N = |S| and that in our hardness instance N → ∞. Using (9), we will
provide an upper bound on the approximation ratio which, for any constant  > 0, approaches to
(1 − 1/e)(1 + ) as N approaches infinity. This proves that the approximation ratio can not be a
constant larger than 1− 1/e.
To this end, first note that if
∑
i∈S ci ≤ B(1 + ), then we have U∗ ≥ N1+ − 1; this holds due to
Lemma 6. We can use this fact along with (9) to write the following upper bound on the (expected)
approximation ratio:
(1− e−N ) · N · F (p
∗)
N/(1 + )− 1 + e
−N · 1.
The above ratio clearly approaches F (p∗)(1 + ) as N →∞. Noting that F (p∗) = 1− 1/e finishes
the proof. 2
Now we use Theorem 2 to prove its counterpart for divisible items.
Corollary 1 For the case of divisible items, no truthful budget feasible mechanism can achieve
approximation ratio better than 1− 1/e.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists a mechanism with approximation ratio α > 1−
1/e for some constant α. Then, we show that we can convert this mechanism to an α-approximation
mechanism for indivisible items which is truthful and budget feasible in expectation. This would
contradict Theorem 2.
To do this conversion, we repeat the exact same argument that we used to prove Theorem 2.
As the result, we can convert the given α-approximation mechanism to a uniform posted price
mechanism with approximation ratio α. Note that all posted price mechanisms allocate items
without dividing them. Consequently, we have an α-approximation mechanism for indivisible items.
Contradiction. 2
7 Conclusion
Our main contribution is designing optimal budget feasible mechanisms for the knapsack model
in large markets. First, we assume that the items are divisible, and study a natural class of de-
terministic mechanisms: each mechanism in this class is characterized by a decreasing allocation
function. All the mechanisms in this class are individually rational, truthful and budget feasible,
but they have different approximation ratios based on the choice of the allocation function. We find
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a mechanism in this class which has an approximation ratio 1 − 1/e, and prove that no truthful
mechanism can achieve a better approximation ratio.
We also provide a mechanism with approximation ratio 1− 1/e for the case of indivisible items:
the idea is to first run the mechanism for divisible items, and then round the obtained fractional
solution (allocation). We design a rounding process that takes the fractional allocation as its
input and outputs an integral allocation with its associated payments. Due to the properties of
our rounding process, the resulting mechanism is individual rational, truthful-in-expectation, and
budget feasible; also, it has approximation ratio 1− 1/e in large markets.
Finally, we study the problem for submodular utility functions with indivisible items. For this
case, we first design a deterministic mechanism which has approximation ratio 12 in large markets;
this mechanism can have an exponential running time in general. Inspired by this mechanism, we
also design a polynomial-time deterministic mechanism with approximation ratio 13 . We do not
provide any results for when the items are divisible in the submodular model: One has to model the
utility function over divisible items; the multilinear extension Vondrak (2008) or Lovàsz extension
of submodular functions is a potential choice for this purpose. We leave open this case for future
study. Bayesian
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A Analyzing our Optimal Truthful Mechanism for the general case
In this section we will prove that the approximation ratio of Mechanism Truthful(f) approaches
1 − 1/e as θ, the market’s largeness ratio, approaches 0. We emphasize that here we dismiss the
extra assumption that was made in Section 5.2: There, we assumed all items have utility 1, here we
give a proof for the general case when item i provides utility ui > 0.
Lemma 10 For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, rk ≥ (1− θ)r?.
Proof. We just need to prove that f(1−θ)r? is not a fit rule (i.e. does not consume all of the budget)
when we set the cost of item k to 0. First of all, note that
Q(1−θ)r?(x) = (1− θ)Qr?(
x
1− θ ) ≤ (1− θ)Qr?(x)
Here we used the fact that Qr? is a decreasing function. This implies that
∑n
i=1 uiQ(1−θ)r?(
ci
ui
) ≤
(1 − θ)B. This expression is the budget consumed by the rule f(1−θ)r? without setting the cost of
item k to 0. When we set ck to 0, the amount of budget consumed can be bounded in the following
manner
ukQ(1−θ)r?(0) +
∑
i 6=k
uiQ(1−θ)r?(
ui
ci
) ≤ (1− θ)B + uk
(
Q(1−θ)r?(0)−Q(1−θ)r?(
ck
uk
)
)
(10)
Note that Q(1−θ)r?(·) is defined to be the area of the shaded region as seen in figure 1. Therefore
one can crudely upper bound the difference Q(1−θ)r?(0) − Q(1−θ)r?(x) by x × f(1−θ)r?(0) for any
x ≥ 0. Now letting x = ckuk , and substituting in inequality 10 we get
ukQ(1−θ)r?(0) +
∑
i 6=k
uiQ(1−θ)r?(
ui
ci
) ≤ (1− θ)B + uk( ck
uk
− 0)
= (1− θ)B + ck ≤ B
This completes the proof. 2
Lemma 11 Mechanism Truthful(f) has an approximation ratio approaching 1− 1e as θ approaches
0.
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that r? = 1 (since we can scale the budget and costs by an appropriate
scaling factor). Now let us pick a constant threshold 0 < s < e − 1 and partition the indices
{1, . . . , n} into two sets I and J : let J be the set of indices i where ciui > s and let I be the
complement.
Let r+ be the minimum ri where i ∈ J . If J happens to be empty, let r+ = r? = 1. Let B′ be
the budget consumed by the allocation rule fr+ , i.e. let B′ =
∑n
i=1 uiQr+(
ci
ui
). We will prove that
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B′ is close to B. If r+ = r?, this is obviously true because B′ = B. So assume that r+ = rk for
some k ∈ J .
Because of the way rk is chosen, we have
B = ukQrk(0) +
∑
i 6=k
uiQrk(
ci
ui
) ≤ uk +
∑
i 6=k
uiQrk(
ci
ui
) (11)
Here we used the fact that Qrk(0) ≤ Qr?(0) = 1 (since we assumed r? = 1). Note that B′ ≥∑
i 6=k uiQr+(
ci
ui
). Combining this with the inequality 11 we get
B′ ≥ B − uk = B − ck uk
ck
≥ B − ck
s
≥ (1− θ
s
)B
Using lemma 6, one can see that u?(B′) ≥ (1− θs )u?(B). But we also know from lemma 4 that
the utility achieved by fr+ is at least (1− 1e )u?(B′). Therefore we have
n∑
i=1
uifr+(
ci
ui
) ≥ (1− θ
s
)(1− 1
e
)u?(B) (12)
For an item i ∈ I, we have ri ≥ (1− θ)r? = 1− θ (we used lemma 10). Therefore
fri(
ci
ui
)
f( ciui )
=
f( 1ri
ci
ui
)
f( ciui )
≥ f(
1
1−θ
ci
ui
)
f( ciui )
One can easily verify that ln f is a concave function. Therefore
f( 1
ri
x)
f(x) for x ≤ s is minimized at
x = s. This means that
fri(
ci
ui
)
f( ciui )
≥ f(
s
ri
)
f(s)
≥ f(
s
1−θ )
f(s)
If we let α =
f( s
ri
)
f(s) , then for every i ∈ I we have
fri(
ci
ui
) ≥ αf( ci
ui
) ≥ αfr+(
ci
ui
)
Similarly, for every item i ∈ J , ri ≥ r+ and therefore fri( ciui ) ≥ fr+(
ci
ui
) ≥ αfr+( ciui ).
We just proved that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, fri( ciui ) ≥ αfr+(
ci
ui
). Combining this with inequality
12 we get
n∑
i=1
uifri(
ci
ui
) ≥ α(1− θ
s
)(1− 1
e
)u?(B)
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So the approximation ratio for Mechanism Truthful(f) is at least
α(1− θ
s
)(1− 1
e
) =
ln(e− s1−θ )
ln(e− s) (1−
θ
s
)(1− 1
e
)
For any fixed s, strictly smaller than e − 1, one can observe that the ratio above approaches
1− 1e as θ → 0. We will not attempt to optimize the value of s for the sake of brevity. 2
B Missing Proofs from Section 5.2
Proof of Lemma 5:
For any i, j such that i ≤ j, we prove that ri ≥ rj , this would prove the lemma. The proof is
by contradiction, suppose ri < rj . First, note that Qri(0) +
∑
k∈S\{i}Qri(ck) represents the sum
of payments in Envy-Free(f) when the cost of i is set to 0. Since Envy-Free(f) spends all of the
budget, then we have:
Qri(0) +
∑
k∈S\{i}
Qri(ck) = B. (13)
Also, note that Qrj (0)+
∑
k∈S\{j}Qri(ck) represents the sum of payments in Envy-Free(f) when
the cost of j is set to 0; a similar argument shows that
Qrj (0) +
∑
k∈S\{j}
Qrj (ck) = B. (14)
Taking the difference between (13) and (14) implies that(
Qri(0)−Qrj (0)
)
+
(
Qri(cj)−Qrj (ci)
)
= 0 (15)
Now, observe that since ri < rj and ci ≤ cj , then we have that Qri(0) < Qrj (0) and Qri(cj) <
Qrj (ci). This contradicts with (15). 2
Proof of Lemma 6: We need to prove that for B1, B2 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
λu?(B1) + (1− λ)u?(B2) ≤ u?(λB1 + (1− λ)B2)
Let xi be the amount of item i we allocate to achieve u?(B1) and let yi be the amount of item
i we allocate to achieve u?(B2).
Now let zi = λxi + (1 − λ)yi. Note that since 0 ≤ xi, yi ≤ 1, we also have 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1. If we
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allocate zi from item i, the utility we get will be
n∑
i=1
uizi = λ(
n∑
i=1
uixi) + (1− λ)(
n∑
i=1
uiyi) = λu
?(B1) + (1− λ)u?(B2)
The cost paid by these allocations is simply
n∑
i=1
cizi = λ(
n∑
i=1
cixi) + (1− λ)(
n∑
i=1
ciyi) ≤ λB1 + (1− λ)B2
Therefore zi’s are an allocation that spend a budget of at most λB1+(1−λ)B2 and yet achieve
a utility of λu?(B1) + (1− λ)u?(B2). This proves that
u?(λB1 + (1− λ)B2) ≥ λu?(B1) + (1− λ)u?(B2)
2
C Mechanisms for Indivisible Items
In this section, using our mechanism for divisible items, we design a mechanism for indivisible
items with approximation ratio 1− 1/e. The idea is to first run the mechanism for divisible items,
and then round the obtained fractional solution (allocation). We design a rounding process that
takes the fractional allocation as its input and outputs an integral allocation with its associated
payments. Due to the properties of our rounding process, the resulting mechanism is individual
rational, truthful, and budget feasible; also, it has approximation ratio 1− 1/e in large markets.
First, we explain a set of properties that we need the rounding procedure to satisfy. If the
rounding procedure satisfies these properties, then its individual rationality, truthfulness, and bud-
get feasibility would be guaranteed. Also, these properties guarantee that the approximation ratio
would remain 1− 1/e. First we explain these properties in Section C.1, then, we state our rounding
procedure and prove that it satisfies these desired properties in Section C.2.
C.1 Properties of the Rounding Procedure
Let x˜1, . . . , x˜n represent a fractional allocation where x˜i denotes the allocated fraction from seller
i ∈ S; also, let p˜1, . . . , p˜n be the associated payments for this allocation. We round this solution to
an integral solution, represented by the allocation x1, . . . , xn and payments p1, . . . , pn, such that:
1. Item i is bought with probability x˜i.
2. If item i is bought, then pi = p˜i/x˜i, and pi = 0 otherwise.
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3.
∑
i∈S pi ≤ B + cmax.
Properties 1 and 2 imply individual rationality and truthfulness: Verifying individual rationality
is straight-forward due to the individual rationality of the fractional solution. For truthfulness, just
see that E[xi] = x˜i and E[pi] = p˜i, which implies E[pi − cixi] = p˜i − cix˜i. This just means that, in
the mechanism for indivisible items, i cannot benefit (in expectation) by misreporting, since she is
already receiving the maximum possible expected utility that she can ever achieve.
Properties 1 and 2 also imply budget feasibility in expectation, however, Property 3 provides a
much stronger guarantee: the budget will not be violated by an additive factor more than cmax.7
C.2 Description of the Rounding Procedure
In this section, we focus in designing a rounding procedure which satisfies Properties 1, 2 and 3. To
this end, we first need to define a polytope P that represents all the (fractional) allocations which,
in a certain sense, are budget feasible:
P =
{
y ∈ [0, 1]n :
∑
i∈S
yi · p˜i
x˜i
≤ B
}
First, we prove that extreme points of P are “almost” integral.
Definition 7 A point y ∈ [0, 1]n is called semi-integral if there is at most one entry of y which is
non-integral, i.e. there is at most one index i such that 0 < yi < 1.
Lemma 12 All the extreme points of P are semi-integral.
Proof. The proof is straight-forward, we give a high-level description and omit the formal details.
The idea is to see P as the intersection of a hypercube and a hyperplane; the hypercube is [0, 1]n
and the hyperplane is
∑
i∈S yi · p˜ix˜i ≤ B. So, any extreme point of P either is an extreme point of
the hypercube (which is integral), or is on the intersection of the hyperplane and an edge of the
hypercube. In the latter case, it can be seen that such a point has at most one fractional entry,
since any two adjacent vertices on the hypercube are different in at most one entry. 2
Outline of the Rounding Procedure The procedure accepts the fractional allocation con-
structed by the mechanism, i.e. x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n), and then writes it as a convex combination of
extreme points of P. Then, it samples an extreme point from the convex combination, where each
point is selected with probability proportional to its coefficients in the convex combination. Finally,
it rounds the sampled extreme point (which is a semi-integral point) to an integral point. We use
the following fact about semi-integral points for implementing the last step:
7We can always reduce the budget slightly to get strict budget feasiblility, e.g. we can reduce the budget to
(1− )B for an arbitrary small  > 0. This will not affect the approximation ratio (asymptotically) in a large market.
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Fact 1 A semi-integral point y ∈ [0, 1]n can be written as the convex combination of two integral
points which differ in at most one entry, i.e. y = αy′ + (1−α)y′′ where y′, y′′ ∈ {0, 1}n are integral
points which differ in at most one entry.
Now we are ready to formally state our main rounding procedure.
Procedure EfficientRounding
input : Allocation vector x˜ and Payment vector p˜
1 Find extreme points z1, . . . , zK ∈ P and positive numbers λ1, . . . , λK summing up to one
such that x˜ =
∑K
i=1 λi · zi ;
2 Sample a single point from {z1, . . . , zK} where zi is selected with probability λi; Let z
denote the sampled point;
3 Write z as the convex combination of two integral points x1, x2 such that x1, x2 differ in at
most one entry, i.e. suppose z = α · x1 + (1− α)x2;
4 With probability α, let x = x1, otherwise, let x = x2;
5 Announce x as the final allocation and pay xi · p˜i/x˜i to seller i.
Lemma 13 Procedure EfficientRounding satisfies Properties 1, 2 and 3.
Proof. It is straight-forward to verify that Properties 1 and 2 hold; for any seller i ∈ S we have:
E[xi] =E[α · x1i + (1− α) · x2i ]
=E[zi] = E
K∑
j=1
λi · zji = x˜i
which implies Property 1 since xi is a binary random variable. Property 2 trivially holds by the
construction of Procedure EfficientRounding.
It remains to prove Property 3. To this end, define p(y) =
∑
i∈S yi · p˜i/x˜i for any y ∈ [0, 1]n. We
prove the claim by showing that p(x) ≤ B+ cmax. Equivalently, we can show that p(x1) ≤ B+ cmax
and p(x2) ≤ B + cmax. We prove this only for x1, the proof for x2 is identical. The claim is trivial
if x1 = x2, since in this case we have x1 ∈ P, which means p(x1) ≤ B. So suppose x1 6= x2. Recall
that we have
z = α · x1 + (1− α)x2,
where x1, x2 are two adjacent vertices on the hypercube. Also, recall that any two adjacent vertices
on the hypercube are different in exactly one entry, so suppose x1, x2 are different in entry j, i.e.
x1j 6= x2j . Now, we prove the lemma by showing that
p(x1) ≤ p(z) + p˜j · 1− x˜j
x˜j
≤ B + cmax. (16)
29
First verify that the first inequality in (16) holds since x1 and z are only different in their
j-th entry: if x1j = 0, then p(x1) ≤ p(z); if x1j = 1, then it is straight-forward to verify that
p(x1) = p(z) + p˜j(1− x˜j)/x˜j . Having that the first inequality holds, (16) is proved if we show that
p(z) ≤ B, (17)
p˜j(1− x˜j)/x˜j ≤ cmax. (18)
To verify (17), just note that z ∈ P. To verify (18), recall that x˜j = fr(cj/uj) and p˜j = uj ·Qr(cj/uj)
for some r > 0; we will prove the following bounds on r:
p˜j/x˜j ≤ ruj , (19)
r ≤ cj/uj
1− x˜j . (20)
Observe that combining (19) and (20) implies (18). So, we are done if we prove (19) and (20) hold.
To prove (19), it is enough to note that Qr(cj/uj) ≤ rx˜j , i.e. the area under the curve fr that
represents the payment per unit of utility to seller j fits in a rectangle with width r and height x˜j ;
this implies p˜j/x˜j ≤ ruj . It is also straight-forward to verify (20) holds due to the concavity of fr.
2
D The Optimal Standard Allocation Rule
Mechanism Truthful(f) is defined uniquely by the standard allocation rule f . Here we provide
an alternative proof for showing that our choice of f(x) = ln(e − x) is optimal, in the sense that
Mechanism Truthful(f) attains the best approximation ratio under this choice. Although this fact
is also a consequence of what we already proved in Section 6, we provide a more direct proof here
with a prior-free hardness instance.
For simpler analysis, we first ignore the trick that we used for making our mechanism truthful:
we work with the non-truthful, but cleaner mechanism Envy-Free(f) and we prove that no approx-
imation ratio better than 1 − 1e is attainable using any standard allocation rule f . In the end, we
see that the trick that makes mechanisms truthful only worsens the approximation ratio. There-
fore the optimality result also applies to the family of truthful mechanisms defined by Mechanism
Truthful(f).
We provide hardness examples with unit utilities, i.e. with ui = 1 for all i ∈ S. We also
drop the indices from payment functions P . This is done because all the payment functions are
identical: Note that Envy-Free(f) uses the same allocation rule for all the sellers, which means
the unit-payment functions are identical. Also, since all the utilities are 1, then the unit-payment
functions are identical to the payment functions, i.e. P (c) = Q(c). Unless specified otherwise we
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also assume that the scaling ratio r? is 1. i.e. we have P (c) = Q(c) = Q1(c) and f(c) = f1(c).
Definition 8 Assume that we are given a standard allocation rule f . Define the set Sf ⊆ R2 as
follows
Sf = {(f(c), P (c)− c) | c ∈ R}
where P (c) is the payment rule associated with the allocation rule f (i.e. P (c) = Q1(c). Also define
the set Tf as the downward closure of Sf , i.e.
Tf = {(x, y) ∈ R2 | ∃y′ ≥ y : (x, y′) ∈ Sf}
Note that in our definition we simply work with the standard function f and not its scaled
variants fr. The following lemma gives us a way to find out if the approximation ratio attained by
the mechanism is worse than a number β.
Lemma 14 Suppose that the point (β, 0) lies in the convex hull of Tf . Then the mechanism defined
by f has approximation ratio at most β.
Proof. Assume that the point (β, 0) can be written as the convex combination of points in Tf in
the following way
(β, 0) =
n∑
i=1
αipi
where αi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, and p1, . . . , pn ∈ Tf . Because of the way Tf is defined, for each pi one
can find a value ci such that pi = (f(ci), yi) and yi ≤ P (ci)− ci. Then this means that
n∑
i=1
αif(ci) =β (21)
n∑
i=1
αi(P (ci)− ci) ≥0 (22)
Now let M be a very large number and consider M sellers. For each i, let αi fraction of the
sellers price their item at ci. The issue of αiM not being integral can be easily dealt with, but
would unnecessarily complicate the proof, hence we assume αiM is integral. Assume that each
seller’s item is worth one unit to the buyer. Now let the buyer’s budget B be
B =M
n∑
i=1
αiP (ci)
With this definition, we are simply saying that f is fit with respect to our budget, or in other
words, the mechanism consumes all of the budget at r = 1.
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Because of (22), our budget B is at least as large as the sum of the costs of all itemsM
∑n
i=1 αici.
Therefore we could buy all of the items and obtain a utility of M , if we were not constrained by
the mechanism. But because of (21), our mechanism obtains a utility of βM . Therefore the
approximation ratio in this example is βMM = β. 2
It is worth mentioning that the reverse of lemma 14 is also true under some mild conditions,
but in this section we are only concerned with the direction proved.
Building on top of our lemma, we can now prove that 1 − 1e is the best approximation factor
among the mechanisms defined by a standard allocation rule.
Theorem 3 Given any standard allocation rule f , the mechanism Envy-Free(f) has approximation
ratio at most 1− 1e .
Proof. To prove this, we simply need to show that the point (1− 1e + , 0) is inside the convex hull
of Tf for every  > 0.
Suppose the contrary is true. So for some  > 0, the point (β, 0) = (1− 1e + , 0) is not inside the
convex hull of Tf . Since the point is not inside the convex hull, there is a line that separates them.
We can further assume that this line passes through the point and is therefore given by the equation
y = s(x − β) for some slope s. Since Tf is downward closed with respect to the y coordinate, Tf
must fall completely below this line. Since Sf ⊆ Tf , this means that Sf must also fall completely
below this line which means that for all c, we have
P (c)− c ≤ s(f(c)− β) (23)
We can safely assume that s > 0. If this was not true, then for c = 0, we would necessarily have
f(c) < β. But this already shows that the mechanism never buys more than a fraction of β of any
item, and therefore the approximation factor cannot be larger than β.
Now consider the function f0(x) = ln(max(e − tx, 1)) for some given t > 0. For this alloaction
function let P0 be the Myerson’s payment rule, i.e. P0(x) = xf0(x) +
∫∞
x f(x)dx (the shaded area
in figure 1). One can easily verify that for 0 ≤ c ≤ e−1t∫ ∞
c
f0(x)dx = c− e− 1
t
− (c− e
t
) ln(e− tc)
and therefore
P0(c)− c = e
t
ln(e− tc)− e− 1
t
=
e
t
(f0(c)− (1− 1
e
)) (24)
If we choose t so that s = et , then equation 24 becomes very similar to the inequality 23. If we
subtract equation 24 from the inequality 23, then we get
P (c)− P0(c) ≤ s(f(c)− f0(c)− ) (25)
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This inequality holds for 0 ≤ c ≤ e−1t = s(1 − 1e ). For c = 0, we get that P (0) − P0(0) ≤
s(f(0)− 1− ) < 0. Therefore P (0) < P0(0).
Let c∗ = sup{c | f(c) < f0(c)}. This supremum is strictly greater than 0, because otherwise
we would have f(x) ≥ f0(x) for all x > 0, which would mean that P (0) ≥ P0(0), which is a
contradiction. This supremum is also finite because for c ≥ e−1t we have f0(c) = 0 and f(c) ≥ 0.
Because c∗ is the supremum, we can find a sequence of points c1, c2, . . . , such that f(ci) < f0(ci)
for all i, and ci → c∗. For each such ci, we have ci ≤ c∗ ≤ e−1t , and therefore the inequality 25
holds. This means that
ci(f(ci)− f0(ci)) +
∫ ∞
ci
(f(x)− f0(x))dx ≤ s(f(ci)− f0(ci)− )
By rearranging the terms we get∫ ∞
ci
(f(x)− f0(x))dx ≤ (s− ci)(f(ci)− f0(ci))− s ≤ −s
Here we used the fact that ci ≤ c∗ ≤ s(1− 1e ) < s and f(ci)− f0(ci) < 0.
But now as we take the limit as i→∞, we get∫ ∞
c∗
(f(x)− f0(x))dx ≤ −s
which is a contradiction because for x > c∗, we have f(x) − f0(x) ≥ 0, and so the integral cannot
be negative. 2
Theorem 4 For any standard allocation rule f , Mechanism Truthful(f) has approximation ratio
at most 1− 1e .
Proof. Mechanism Truthful(f) always achieves a worse or equal utility compared to Envy-Free(f).
Therefore its approximation ratio is at most 1− 1e by Theorem 3. 2
E Submodular Utility Functions
In this section, we present truthful mechanisms for the knapsack problem when the utility function
for the buyer is a monotone submodular function rather than an additive function. More precisely, a
monotone submodular function F : 2S → R+ defines the utility that the buyer derives from buying
a subset of S. The buyers problem then becomes selecting a subset S? ⊂ S such that S? is budget
feasible, i.e. c(S?) ≤ B, and S? has the highest utility, F (S?), among all the budget feasible subsets.
(recall that c(S?) denotes
∑
i∈S? ci)
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This problem has first been studied in Singer (2010) for arbitrary markets and a 0.0089-
approximation is presented for it. Later, Chen et al. (2011) improved this result by giving an
exponential-time deterministic mechanism with approximation ratio 0.119 and a polynomial-time
randomized mechanism with approximation ratio 0.126.
Our Results In this section, we focus on studying this problem in large markets where each
individual can not significantly affect the market (see Section E.1 for a formal definition). Under
this assumption, we design a deterministic mechanism which has approximation ratio 12 , but has
an exponential running time. Later, we will see that the exponential running time is solely due to
the computational difficulty of solving the knapsack problem for submodular functions. In fact, our
mechanism is also a polynomial-time (γ2/2)-approximation when it has access to a γ-approximation
oracle for solving the knapsack problem (see Section E.3). To the extent of our knowledge, the best
existing approximation oracle has γ = 1−1/e due to Sviridenko (2004); this provides us a mechanism
with approximation ratio γ2/2 ≈ 0.2.
We take a step further and improve this result by presenting a deterministic polynomial-time
1
3 -approximation mechanism in Section E.4. This mechanism, although using a greedy optimization
oracle with γ = 1− 1/e, has approximation ratio equal to 13 (rather than γ2/2 ≈ 0.2).
Oneway-Truthfulness All of the mechanisms that we have are truthful, however, we first present
a simpler version of them which are not fully truthful but satisfy truthfulness in a weaker form,
which we call oneway-truthfulness. Briefly, by this property, players only have incentive to report
costs lower than their true cost. This notion is formally defined in Section E.2.2.
In Section E.5, we convert our oneway-truthful mechanisms to (fully) truthful mechanisms only
by changing the payment rule. It is worth pointing out that analyzing the performance ratio of
oneway-truthful mechanisms is not much different than analyzing truthful mechanisms: Since the
cost of optimum solution may only decrease if players report lower costs, then any α-approximate
solution for the reported instance is also an α-approximate solution for the original instance.
E.1 Preliminaries
In this section, first we state a a few basic definitions. Then, we formally define the large market
assumption and oneway-truthfulness. Finally, we state a few definitions regarding submodular
functions which are used in our mechanisms.
E.2 Basic Definitions
Similar to before, we say a subset of sellers T ⊆ S is budget feasible if c(T ) ≤ B. Utility of the
subset T is defined by F (T ). The optimum subset, S?, is the budget feasible subset with the highest
utility. We call F (S?) the optimum utility and also denote it by F ?.
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E.2.1 The Large Market Assumption
Our large market assumption here is almost identical to the alternative large market assumption
that was discussed in Section 1.1.1. Intuitively, it says that no individual affects the (optimum
solution of the) market significantly. This assumption is formally defined below.
Let umax = maxs∈S F ({s}) and U∗ be the total utility of the optimum solution (i.e. the maximum
achievable utility when the costs are known). This large market assumption states that
Definition 9 We say that a market is large if umax  U∗.
In other words, we define the largeness ratio of the market to be θ = umaxU? and analyze our mecha-
nisms for when θ → 0.
E.2.2 Oneway-Truthfulness
Think of a reverse auction with a set of sellers S where each seller i ∈ S has a private cost ci.
In a truthful mechanism, no seller wants to report a fake cost regardless of what others do. In a
oneway-truthful mechanism, no seller wants to report a cost higher than its true cost regardless of
what others do.
For clarification, we first define the notion of cost vector briefly: when we say a cost vector d,
we mean a vector which has an entry di corresponding to any seller i, where di represents the cost
associated with seller i. Now we formally define the notion of oneway-truthfulness as follows:
Definition 10 A mechanism M is oneway-truthful if, for any seller i ∈ S and any cost vector d
for which di > ci, we have:
ui(ci, d−i) ≥ ui(d)
where d−i denotes any cost vector corresponding to the rest of players except i and ui(·) denotes the
utility of player i.
E.2.3 Submodular Functions
Given the submodular function F : 2S → R+, we define an ordering of the elements of S with
respect to F , which we call the greedy sequence and denote it by χ(F ) = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. For simplicity
in the definition, we first define an auxiliary notion as follows: let χi = ∪ij=1{xi} for all i, and let
χ0 = ∅. The sequence is constructed such that
xi = argmax
s∈S\χi−1
F (χi−1 ∪ {s})
for all positive i ≤ n.
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It is easy to verify that χ(F ) can be constructed in polynomial time by finding the values of
x1, . . . , xn one by one in the order that they appear in χ(F ). After constructing of the greedy
sequence, define ∂i = F (χi)− F (χi−1) for all i ≤ n.
E.3 The Exp-Time Mechanism
In this Section, we present an extremely simple mechanism which we call the Oracle Mechanism.
Given a submodular function F : 2S → R+, the mechanism first finds the optimal budget feasible
subset, i.e. the subset S? ⊆ S such that S? is budget feasible and has the highest utility among
all the budget feasible subsets. Let F ? = F (S?) and r? = BF ? . We also call F
?, r? respectively the
optimum utility and the optimum cost per utility rate. We also call r? the optimum rate when there
is no risk of confusion.
Winner Selection The Mechanism constructs the sequence χ(F ) and chooses the largest integer
k such that F (χk) ≤ F ?/2. Then, it reports χk as the set of winners.
The Payment Rule For simplicity, assume that the winners are indexed from 1, . . . , k. The
Payment to winner i is equal to 2ri ·∂i, where ri is the optimum cost per utility rate for the instance
in which seller i is removed from the set of sellers, S. In other words, think of an auxiliary instance
in which we are given budget B and the cost of every seller is the same as the original instance
except that ci =∞. Then, ri is the optimum cost per utility rate in this instance.
Mechanism 1: Oracle Mechanism
input : Submodular utility function F , Budget B
Sellers report their costs;
Compute the optimum utility F ? and the optimum cost per utility rate r?;
Construct the sequence χ(F ) ;
Find the largest integer k such that F (χk) ≤ F ?/2;
Announce χk as the set of winners;
foreach i ∈ χk do
S ← S\{i};
Let ri be the optimum cost per utility rate in the current instance;
Pay 2ri · ∂i to seller i;
S ← S ∪ {i};
end
Below we prove that the Oracle Mechanism is individually rational, oneway-truthful, and it has
approximation ratio 12 in large markets. Also, it is almost budget feasible, i.e. we can show that the
total sum of its payments is at most B + o(B). So, all we need for having a strictly budget feasible
mechanism is starting with a slightly decreased budget. We will see that this does not affect the
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approximation ratio of the mechanism asymptotically due to the large market assumption. The
formal proof for this is deferred to Section E.6.
Simplifying Assumption Through out the analysis, w.l.o.g. we assume that the sellers appear
in the greedy sequence in an increasing order, i.e. xi = i for all i ∈ S.
Lemma 15 The Oracle Mechanism is individually rational.
Proof. We show that ci ≤ 2r? · ∂i and r? ≤ ri. These two imply ci ≤ 2ri · ∂i which is individual
rationality. First we prove r? ≤ ri as follows. Let F ?i denote the optimum utility when seller i is
removed. Clearly, we have F ?i ≤ F ?. This just means r? ≤ ri since we have riF ?i = r?F ? = B.
It remains to show that ci ≤ 2r? ·∂i. Note that we only need to show this for the last winner, i.e.
it suffices to prove that ck ≤ 2r? · ∂k since we have ci∂i ≤
cj
∂j
iff i ≤ j. The proof is by contradiction,
suppose ck > 2r? · ∂k.
For more intuition, we first explain our argument for contradiction in words and then we state
it more formally. From the definition of the greedy sequence χ(F ), it can be seen that conditioned
on buying the subset χk, the cost for buying each extra unit of utility is at least ck∂k , which is more
than 2r?. So, even if we get the subset χk for free, the cost for buying an additional F (S?)−F (χk)
units of utility (which is needed for the optimum solution) would be
(F (S?)− F (χk)) · ck
∂k
≥F
?
2
· ck
∂k
>
F ?
2
· 2r? = B.
This means cost of the optimum solution is more than B.
To formalize this contradiction, just note that by monotonicity of F , we have
F (S? ∪ χk)− F (χk) ≥ F
?
2
. (26)
Now observe that by the definition of the greedy sequence χ(F ), the cost for buying each extra unit
of utility conditioned on having χk is at least ck∂k . This fact, and (26) together imply that
c(S? ∪ χk)− c(χk) ≥ ck
∂k
· F
?
2
. (27)
On the other hand, recall that ck > 2r? · ∂k, so we can write (27) as
c(S? ∪ χk)− c(χk) ≥ ck
∂k
· F
?
2
> r? · F ? = B.
This implies c(S?) > B which is a contradiction with the budget feasibility of S?. 2
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Lemma 16 The Oracle Mechanism is oneway-truthful.
Proof. For contradiction, suppose there exists a seller i ∈ S who has incentive to report a cost ci
which is higher that its true cost ci. Assuming that the mechanism picked χk as the set of winners,
we have either i > k or i ≤ k. The proof is done separately in each of these cases.
If i > k, then see that seller i can not change the first i − 1 elements of χ(F ) by reporting a
higher cost. Now, see that if i > k + 1, then again χk will be chosen as the set of winners, which is
a contradiction with the incentive of seller i for misreporting. If i = k + 1, then see that χk will be
chosen as a subset of the winners; in this case, the set of winners can possibly contain other sellers,
but not certainly not seller k + 1 (due to the monotonicity of F ). Consequently, seller i remains a
loser even by reporting ci. Contradiction.
It remains to do the proof for when i ≤ k. Recall that the payment to seller i is 2ri · ∂i. Since
ri is not a function of the cost reported by seller i, then see that the only way that i can increase
her utility by misreporting, is increasing ∂i. But by reporting a cost higher than ci, seller i can not
change the first i− 1 elements of χ(F ), which means she can only decrease ∂i by reporting a higher
cost. So, the payment to i does not increase if she reports a higher cost. This concludes the lemma.
2
Lemma 17 In a θ-large market, the Oracle Mechanism has approximation ratio 12 − θ, i.e. asymp-
totically equal to 12 in a large market.
Proof. It is enough to note that F (χk+1) ≥ F ?/2, which implies F (χk) ≥ F ? · (1/2− θ) due to the
large market assumption. 2
Now, we prove that sum of the payments in the Oracle Mechanism is at most B + o(B), or in
simple words, it is almost budget feasible.
Definition 11 A mechanism is almost budget feasible if its payments sum up to at most B+o(B).
As we mentioned before, (in large markets) we can convert any almost budget feasible mechanism
to a budget feasible mechanism without any loss in its approximation ratio (asymptotically). This
can be done simply by running the mechanism with a slightly reduced budget; the proof is deferred
to Section E.6.
Lemma 18 The Oracle Mechanism is almost budget feasible.
Proof. Recall that the sum of payments is equal to
∑k
i=1 ri · ∂i. To prove the lemma, it is enough
to show that for any seller i ∈ S, we have ri ≤ r? · (1− θ)−1; because then we have
k∑
i=1
ri · ∂i ≤ r? · (1− θ)−1 ·
k∑
i=1
∂i = r
? · (1− θ)−1 · F (χk) ≤ B(1− θ)−1.
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which proves the lemma.
To prove ri ≤ r? · (1− θ)−1, let F ?i denote the optimum utility when seller i is removed. By the
large market assumption, we have F
?
i
F ? ≥ 1− θ. This fact, and the fact that riF ?i = r?F ? = B, imply
that ri ≤ r?1−θ . 2
The Oracle Mechanism in Polynomial Time
In the Oracle Mechanism, we solve a submodular optimization problem which cannot be solved in
polynomial-time, i.e. finding the optimum cost per utility rate which is equivalent to finding the
optimum budget feasible subset. Although this problem cannot be solved in polynomial-time, there
are approximation algorithms that can find near-optimal solutions for it.
Definition 12 Suppose we are given an instance of the problem with a submodular function F ,
budget B, and (publicly known) costs and utilities. A polynomial-time algorithm for solving this
problem is called a γ-approximation oracle if, for any instance, it finds a solution with utility at
least γ · F ?.
Given a γ-approximation oracle, we can run the Oracle mechanism in polynomial time by finding
estimates for F ? and ri’s using the γ-approximation oracle, i.e. instead of computing F ? and ri’s
directly, we compute them using the γ-approximation oracle. The following theorem clarifies the
resulting mechanism further and states the properties it satisfies.
Theorem 5 Suppose the Oracle Mechanism has access to a polynomial-time γ-approximation or-
acle for the knapsack optimization problem. Then, it is a polynomial-time (γ/2)-approximation
mechanism and its payments sum up to at most (B + o(B))/γ.
Proof. We use the γ-approximation oracle for finding an estimate (lower bound) for F ?. Instead
of computing F ? directly, let F ? be the solution which is returned by the γ-approximation oracle.
Also, for computing ri, remove seller i and then compute the optimal utility, namely F ?i , using the
γ-approximation oracle. Everything else remains identical to Mechanism 1.
The proofs for individual rationality and truthfulness follow from the proofs for Mechanism 1.
It remains to prove that the payments sum up to at most B · (1 + o(1))/γ. For this, we follow the
proof of Lemma 18. The key point in the proof of Lemma 18 was that ri ≤ r? · (1− θ)−1. Here, we
prove a weaker inequality ri ≤ r? · (1− θ)−1/γ. Given this inequality, the rest of the proof remains
similar to the proof of Lemma 18. We do not repeat the full proof here and just show that the
weaker inequality holds.
Recall that in this proof, F ? and F ?i denote the utilities computed by the γ-approximation
oracle. Then, by the large market assumption, we have F ?i ≥ F ? · (1− θ)γ . This fact, and the fact
that riF ?i = r
?F ? = B, imply that ri ≤ r? · (1− θ)−1/γ. 2
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Corollary 2 (of Theorem 5) Suppose the Oracle Mechanism has access to a γ-approximation
oracle. Then, if instead of budget B, the mechanism is given a reduced budget γB, it would be an
almost budget feasible mechanism with approximation ratio γ2/2.
E.4 An Improved Polynomial-Time Mechanism
In this section, we present a polynomial-time mechanism with approximation ratio 13 . The mecha-
nism follows the idea of the oracle mechanism, except that instead of computing the optimum cost
per utility rate (which requires exponential running time), the mechanism computes an estimate
for the cost per utility rate, which we call the stopping rate. Before presenting the mechanism, we
need to formally define the notion of stopping rate.
Definition 13 Suppose we are given an instance of the problem with cost vector c, submodular
utility function F and budget B. Construct the sequence χ(F ) and choose the largest integer k such
that F (χk) · cxk∂k ≤ B. The stopping rate, denoted by r(c, F,B), is then defined to be B/F (χk). We
sometimes denote the stopping rate simply by r(B) when c, F are clear from the context.
Now we define the mechanism by presenting the winner selection and payment rules.
Winner Selection The Mechanism constructs the sequence χ(F ) and chooses the largest integer
k such that F (χk) · cxk∂k ≤ B/2. Then, it reports χk as the set of winners.
The Payment Rule For simplicity, assume that the winners are indexed from 1 to k. The
Payment to winner i is equal to 2ri · ∂i, where ri = r(c′, F,B/2) and c′ is the cost vector which is
identical to the original cost vector c except that c′i is set to ∞ (i.e. intuitively, seller i is removed
from S). In other words, think of an auxiliary instance in which we are given budget B/2 and seller
i is removed from the set of sellers S. Then, ri is the stopping rate in this instance.
The above definitions are formally put together in Mechanism 2. We also address our polynomial-
time mechanism as Mechanism 2. In the rest of this section, we prove that Mechanism 2 is individ-
ually rational, oneway-truthful and budget feasible, and also, it has approximation ratio 1/3. As we
mentioned before, this mechanism can be converted to a (fully) truthful and strictly budget feasible
mechanism without any (asymptotic) loss in the approximation ratio; the details are discussed in
Sections E.5 and E.6.
Simplifying Assumption Through out the analysis, w.l.o.g. we assume that the sellers appear
in the greedy sequence in an increasing order, i.e. xi = i for all i ∈ S.
Lemma 19 Mechanism 2 is individually rational.
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Mechanism 2: A polynomial-time (1/3)-approximation mechanism
input : Submodular utility function F , Budget B
Sellers report their costs;
Construct the sequence χ(F );
Find the smallest integer k such that F (χk) · cxk∂k ≤ B/2;
Announce χk as the set of winners;
foreach i ∈ χk do
c′ ← c;
c′i ←∞;
ri ← r(c′, F,B/2) ;
Pay ri · ∂i to seller i;
end
Proof. According to the payment rule, it is enough to show that for each winner i we have
ri ≥ ci/∂i. Let χ(F ) = 〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉 denote the greedy sequence for when i is removed. Also, let
χj denote the subset containing first j elements of χ(F ), and ∂j = F (χj)− F (χj−1).
Note that xj = xj for all j < i. Now, consider the following two cases for the proof: Let k be
the largest integer j satisfying F (χj) · cxj/∂j ≤ B/2. We either have that k = i − 1 or k ≥ i. We
prove the lemma by proving that ri ≥ ci/∂i in each of these cases.
First, suppose k = i−1. This means ri = B2F (χi−1) . Also, note that F (χi)·
ci
∂i
≤ B/2 (since i < k).
The two latter facts, along with the fact that F (χi−1) ≤ F (χi) together imply that ri ≥ ci/∂i.
It remains to do the proof in the second case: Suppose k ≥ i. Note that due to the definition
of the greedy sequence we have cxi/∂i ≤ cxi/∂i. So, the proof is done if we show that ri ≥ cxi/∂i.
To this end, first observe that we have F (χi) · cxi/∂i ≤ B/2 due to the fact that k ≥ i. This just
implies cxi/∂i ≤ B/(2F (χk)) due to the monotonicity of F . Finally, seeing that B/(2F (χk)) = ri
proves the claim. 2
Lemma 20 Mechanism 2 is oneway-truthful.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 16, we state the proof for completeness.
For contradiction, suppose there exists a seller i ∈ S who has incentive to report a cost ci which
is higher than her true cost ci. Assuming that the mechanism picked χk as the set of winners, we
have either i > k or i ≤ k. The proof is done separately in each of these cases.
If i > k, then see that seller i can not change the first i − 1 elements of χ(F ) by reporting a
higher cost. Now, see that if i > k + 1, then again χk will be chosen as the set of winners, which is
a contradiction with the incentive of seller i for misreporting. If i = k + 1, then see that χk will be
chosen as a subset of the winners; in this case, the set of winners can possibly contain other sellers,
but not certainly not seller k + 1 (due to the fact that she was not chosen before). Consequently,
seller i remains a loser even by reporting ci. Contradiction.
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It remains to do the proof for when i ≤ k. Recall that the payment to seller i is ri · ∂i. Since
ri is not a function of the cost reported by seller i, then see that the only way that i can increase
her utility by misreporting, is increasing ∂i. But by reporting a cost higher than ci, seller i can not
change the first i− 1 elements of χ(F ), and so, can only decrease ∂i. Consequently, the payment to
i does not increase in this case as well which means i has no incentive to report a higher cost. 2
Lemma 21 Mechanism 2 has approximation ratio 1/3 in large markets.
Proof. First we prove that F (χk+1) ≥ F ?/3. This would imply F (χk) ≥ F ? · (1/3− θ) due to the
large market assumption, which proves the lemma.
So, it is enough to show that F (χk+1) ≥ F ?/3. We prove this by contradiction, assume
F (χk+1) < F
?/3. For more intuition, we first explain our argument for contradiction in words
and then we state it more formally. From the definition of the greedy sequence χ(F ), it can be seen
that conditioned on buying the subset χk+1, the cost for buying each extra unit of utility is at least
ck+1
∂k+1
. So, even if we get the subset χk+1 for free, the cost for buying an additional 2F
?
3 units of
utility (which is needed for the optimum solution) would be at least
2F ?
3
· ck+1
∂k+1
> 2F (χk+1) · ck+1
∂k+1
≥ B.
This means cost of the optimum solution is more than B.
To formalize this contradiction, just note that by monotonicity of F , we have
F (S? ∪ χk+1)− F (χk+1) > 2F
?
3
. (28)
Now observe that by the definition of the greedy sequence χ(F ), the cost for buying each extra unit
of utility conditioned on having χk+1 is at least
ck+1
∂k+1
. This fact, and (28) together imply that
c(S? ∪ χk+1)− c(χk+1) > ck+1
∂k+1
· 2F
?
3
. (29)
On the other hand, recall that F (χk+1) < F ?/3, so we can write (29) as
c(S? ∪ χk+1)− c(χk+1) > ck+1
∂k+1
· 2F
?
3
> 2F (χk+1) · ck+1
∂k+1
> B.
This implies c(S?) > B which is a contradiction with the budget feasibility of S?. 2
We prove that Mechanism 2 is almost budget feasible in Lemma 23 . Before that, we first need
to prove the following lemma which will be used in the proof of Lemma 23. This Lemma states that
F (χk) is (roughly) at least half of the optimal utility in a large market.
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Lemma 22 Suppose we are given a θ-large market with θ ≤ 1/2 and let χk denote the subset chosen
by Mechanism 2 when run on this instance. Then we have
F (χk) ≥ (1/2− θ) · F ?
Proof. Recall that w.l.o.g. we assume χ = 〈1, . . . , n〉. To prove the lemma, it is enough to show
that F (χk+1) ≥ F ?/2.
F (χk) ≥ F (χk+1)− θ · F ? ≥ (1/2− θ) · F ?,
where the first inequality is due to the large market assumption.
We prove F (χk+1) ≥ F ?/2 by contradiction, assume F (χk+1) < F ?/2. For more intuition, we
first explain our argument for contradiction in words and then we state it more formally. Conditioned
on buying the subset χk+1, the cost for buying each extra unit of utility is at least
ck+1
∂k+1
. So, even
if we get the subset χk+1 for free, the cost for buying an additional F
?
2 units of utility (which is
needed for the optimum solution) would be strictly more than F
?
2 · ck+1∂k+1 ≥ B. To formalize this
contradiction, just note that by monotonicity of F , we have
F (S? ∪ χk+1)− F (χk+1) > F
?
2
. (30)
Now observe that by the definition of the greedy sequence χ(F ), the cost for buying each extra
unit of utility conditioned on having χk+1 is at least
ck+1
∂k+1
. This fact, and (30) together imply that
c(S? ∪ χk+1)− c(χk+1) > ck+1
∂k+1
· F
?
2
≥ B.
This implies c(S?) > B which is a contradiction with the budget feasibility of S?.
2
Lemma 23 Mechanism 2 is almost budget feasible
Proof. Let r denote r(c, F,B/2), which is equal to B/2F (χk) by definition. We show that for any i ∈ χk,
we have ri ≤ 2r · (1− 3θ)−1. This would prove that sum of the payments is at most B · (1− 3θ)−1
since:
k∑
i=1
ri∂i ≤ (1− 3θ)−1 ·
k∑
i=1
2r∂i = (1− 3θ)−1 · 2rF (χk) = (1− 3θ)−1 ·B.
This would finish the proof due to the large market assumption.
To this end, fix a seller i ∈ S and let χ(F ) = 〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉 denote the greedy sequence for
when i is removed from the set of sellers S. Also, let χj denote the subset containing first j
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elements of χ(F ), and ∂j = F (χj) − F (χj−1). Finally, let k be the largest integer j satisfying
F (χj) · cxj/∂j ≤ B/2.
Suppose F ?B/2 denotes the optimal utility for when the budget is reduced to B/2. Then we
would have:
ri =
B/2
F (χk)
≤ B/2
(1/2− θ) · F ?i
(31)
≤ B/2
(1/2− θ) · (1− θ) · F ?B/2
(32)
≤ B/2
(1/2− θ) · (1− θ) · F (χk)
≤ r
(1/2− θ) · (1− θ)
≤ 2r
1− 3θ
where (31) is due to Lemma 22 and (32) is due to the θ-largeness of the market. 2
E.5 From Oneway-Truthfulness to Truthfulness
Changing the payment rule is the key to convert all of our oneway-truthful mechanisms to truthful
mechanisms. In fact, the winner selection rule remains identically the same, however, we replace
the payment rule in all of our mechanisms by the following simple payment rule:
The Critical Cost Payment Rule Each winner i is paid the highest cost that it could report
and still remain a winner.
Individual rationality and truthfulness of all the mechanisms are trivial under this payment rule.
Also, the proofs for approximation ratio remain the same since we have not changed the winner
selection rule. The only non-trivial part is proving the budget feasibility under this new payment
rule. For all of the mechanisms in this paper, we can show that replacing the original payment rule
with the Critical Cost payment rule, does not increase the payment of the mechanism to any of the
winners. First we prove this for the Oracle mechanism.
Lemma 24 In the Oracle mechanism, the payment to each winner does not increase if we replace
the payment rule with the Critical Cost payment rule.
Proof. We need to show that the Critical Cost payment rule does not pay to winner i more than
2ri · ∂i. Equivalently, we show that if i reports a cost ci > 2ri · ∂i, then it will not be selected as a
winner anymore. The proof is by contradiction, suppose i reports a cost higher than ci > 2ri · ∂i
and still gets selected as a winner.
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Let the instance in which the cost ci is replaced by ci be called the fake instance. Let c denote
the cost vector in the fake instance which is identical to the original cost vector c except that c′i is
set to ci. For any subset of sellers S′ ⊆ S, let c(S′) =
∑
s∈S′ cs.
Also, let χ(F ) denote the greedy sequence for the fake instance, χj denote the subset containing
first j elements of χ(F ), and ∂j = F (χj) − F (χj−1). Finally, let S? denote the optimum budget
feasible subset in the fake instance.
For more intuition, we first explain our argument for contradiction in words and then we state
it more formally. See that the optimum utility is at least F ?i in the fake instance (recall that F
?
i
denotes the optimum utility when i is removed from S), which implies F (S?)− F (χk) ≥
F ?i
2 . Also,
we will show that even if we get χk for free, the cost for buying an additional F (S?)− F (χk) units
of utility would be more than 2ri per unit of utility. The two latter facts together would imply that
c(S?\χk) > 2ri ·
(
F (S?)− F (χk)
) ≥ 2ri · F ?i
2
= B
which implies c(S?) > B. This is a contradiction with budget feasibility of S?.
To formalize this contradiction, just note that by the monotonicity of F , we have
F (S? ∪ χk)− F (χk) ≥
F ?i
2
. (33)
Now observe that by the definition of the greedy sequence χ(F ), the cost for buying each extra unit
of utility, conditioned on having the subset χk, is at least ci/∂k, i.e. the cost of the seller at position
k of χ(F ) divided by the marginal utility that it adds. Also, see that ci/∂k > 2ri since ci > 2ri · ∂i
and ∂k ≤ ∂i. This proves that the cost for buying each extra unit of utility, conditioned on having
the subset χk, is more than 2ri. This fact, and (33) together imply that
c(S? ∪ χk)− c(χk) > 2ri ·
F ?i
2
= B.
This implies c(S?) > B which is a contradiction with the budget feasibility of S?. 2
Now, we prove an equivalent version of Lemma 24 for Mechanism 2.
Lemma 25 In Mechanism 2, the payment to each winner does not increase if we replace the pay-
ment rule with the Critical Cost payment rule.
Proof. We need to show that the Critical Cost payment rule does not pay to winner i more than
ri ·∂i. Equivalently, we show that if i reports a cost x with x > ri ·∂i, then it will not be selected as
a winner anymore. The proof is by contradiction, suppose i reports a cost x which is higher than
ri · ∂i and still gets selected as a winner.
Let the instance in which the cost ci is replaced by x be called the fake instance. Let c denote
the cost vector in the fake instance which is identical to the original cost vector c except that ci is
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set to x. For any subset of sellers S′ ⊆ S, let c(S′) =∑s∈S′ cs; when there is no risk of confusion,
we sometimes denote c({i}) by c(i) for any cost function c(·).
Also, consider the instance in which the cost ci is replaced by ∞ (seller i is removed) and call it
the large instance. Let c denote the cost vector in the large instance which is identical to the original
cost vector c except that ci is set to ∞. For any subset of sellers S′ ⊆ S, let c(S′) =
∑
s∈S′ cs.
Let χ(F ) = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 and χ(F ) = 〈x1, . . . , xn−1〉 respectively denote the greedy sequences
for the fake and large instances, and χj , χj respectively denote the subsets containing the first j
elements of χ(F ) and χ(F ). Also, let ∂j = F (χj)− F (χj−1) and ∂j = F (χj)− F (χj−1).
Suppose that Mechanism 2 picks χk as the set of winners in the fake instance and χk as the
set of winners in the large instance, i.e. the mechanism picks the first k elements of χ(F ) and the
first k elements of χ(F ) as the set of winners in each of the instances. First, we need to prove the
following claim and then we proceed to the proof of the lemma.
Claim 3 The first k elements of χ(F ) and χ(F ) are identical.
Proof Let i denote the position of seller i in χ(F ), i.e. we have xi = i. Then, see that
c(x
k
)/∂
k
≤ ri, (34)
which holds since we have F (χk) · c(xk)/∂k ≤ B/2 by the definition of k and ri = B/(2F (χk)) by
the definition of stopping rate.
On the other hand, see that
c(xi)/∂i >ri · ∂i/∂i
≥ri (35)
where (35) is due to the fact that ∂i ≥ ∂i; this fact holds because the first i − 1 elements of χ(F )
and χ(F ) are identical, which means the marginal utility added by seller i in χ(F ) is more than her
marginal in χ(F ).
To summarize, see that by (34) and (35) we have:
c(x
k
)/∂
k
≤ ri,
c(xi)/∂i >ri
which means seller i will be never be used in its first k positions of χ(F ) (due to the greedy
construction of the sequence). Consequently, the first k elements of χ(F ) and χ(F ) are identical.

Now we are ready to see to the contradiction, it follows from the following set of inequalities
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which will be clarified below.
B/2 ≥F (χk) · ck/∂k (36)
>F (χk) ·
ri · ∂i
∂i
(37)
≥F (χk) · ri (38)
≥F (χ
k
) · ri (39)
=B/2
(36) is due to the definition of k in the fake instance;
(37) holds since we have assumed i ≤ k (i.e. i wins in the fake instance) and so we have c(xi)/∂i ≤
ck/∂k by the definition of the greedy sequence, this fact, and the fact that c(xi) > ri · ∂i directly
imply (37);
(38) holds since ∂i ≥ ∂i; we already proved this is true in the proof of Claim 3: because the first
i− 1 elements of χ(F ) and χ(F ) are identical;
(39) follows by the monotonicity of F and since χ
k
⊆ χk (which holds by Claim 3). 2
E.6 Strictly Budget Feasible Mechanisms
In this section, we show how to convert our almost budget feasible mechanisms to strictly budget
feasible mechanisms. We start with the Oracle Mechanism, i.e. Mechanism 1. Recall that in Lemma
18, we proved that sum of the payments in the Oracle mechanism is at most B · (1 − θ)−1. So, if
instead of budget B, we give a reduced budget B · (1 − θ) to the oracle mechanism, then the sum
of its payments would not exceed B.
It only remains to show that this budget reduction does not affect the approximation ratio
significantly. To this end, first we prove that the budget reduction does not affect the optimum
utility significantly.
Lemma 26 Assume we are given a θ-large market and Let F ?b denote the optimal solution for
this market when when the budget is reduced to b ≤ B. Then for any given constant  > 0 and
b = B · (1− ) we have:
F ?b ≥ (1− θ − ) · F ?
Proof. W.L.O.G. suppose that with budget B, the optimal subset is S? = {1, . . . , s}. Let the
submodular function G denote the restriction of F to the subset S?, i.e. G = F |S? . Now, construct
the greedy sequence χ(G), and denote it by χ(G) = 〈1, . . . , s〉, were w.l.o.g. we have assumed that
the members of S? appear in the greedy sequence in the increasing order.
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By assumption, we have that c(S?) ≤ B. Let s′ denote the smallest integer such that
s′∑
i=1
ci ≥ B · (1− ).
Also, let S′ = {1, . . . , s′ − 1}. We claim that
F (S′) ≥ (1− θ − ) · F ?,
which proves the lemma since c(S′) ≤ B · (1− ). To this end, first verify that
F (S′ ∪ {s′}) ≥ F ? · (1− );
this holds by the definition of the greedy sequence, which picks the cheaper items (relative to their
utility) first. Then, observe that F (S′) ≥ F (S′∪{s′})−F ({s′}) due to submodularity. This implies
F (S′) ≥ (1− ) · F ? − θ · F ? = F ? · (1− θ − )
due to the large market assumption. 2
To achieve a strictly budget feasible mechanism for large markets, fix  to be an arbitrary small
constant. In a large market with θ < , we can reduce the budget of the Oracle mechanism to
B · (1 − ) to get a strictly budget feasible mechanism: the Oracle Mechanism would be budget
feasible by Lemma 18. Also, by Lemma 26, such a market (with the reduced budget) would be
θ
1−θ− -large. So, by Lemmas 17 and 26, the approximation ratio of the Oracle mechanism would be(
1
2
− θ
1− θ − 
)
· (1− θ − ).
See that in large markets, where θ → 0, the approximation ratio would be
lim
θ→0
(
1
2
− θ
1− θ − 
)
· (1− θ − ). = 1
2
· (1− ),
i.e. for any arbitrary small  > 0, we have a large market mechanism with approximation ratio
1
2 · (1− ).
By a similar argument, it can be seen that for any arbitrary small constant  > 0, Mechanism 2
can also be converted to a strictly budget feasible mechanism with approximation ratio 13 · (1 − )
in large markets.
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F Hoeffding Bounds
In this section we state a version of Hoeffding bounds (HffdngBnd) that is suitable for our purpose.
Hoeffding Bounds. Let x1, . . . , xn be i.i.d. random variables such that Pr(xi ∈ [a, b]) = 1. Let
µ = E [
∑n
i=1 xi], then we have:
Pr
(
n∑
i=1
xi ≥ (1 + ) · µ
)
≤ e−
22µ2
n(b−a)2 .
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